Our paper on market power mitigation in two-stage markets [1] has been accepted to Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy, and Regulation!
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R. K. Bansal, Y. Chen, P. You, and E. Mallada, “Market Power Mitigation in Two-stage Electricity Market with Supply Function and Quantity Bidding,” IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation, vol. 1, iss. 4, pp. 512-522, 2023. [Bibtex] [Abstract] [Download PDF]
The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market—e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets—is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads to undesirable price manipulation. To mitigate this, some Inde- pendent System Operators (ISOs) proposed system-level market power mitigation (MPM) policies in addition to existing local policies. These policies aim to substitute noncompetitive bids with a default bid based on estimated generator costs. However, these policies may lead to unintended consequences when implemented without accounting for the conflicting interest of participants. In this paper, we model the competition between generators (bidding supply functions) and loads (bidding quantity) in a two-stage market with a stage-wise MPM policy. An equilibrium analysis shows that a real-time MPM policy leads to equilibrium loss, meaning no stable market outcome (Nash equilibrium) exists. A day-ahead MPM policy, besides, leads to a Stackelberg-Nash game with loads acting as leaders and generators as followers. In this setting, loads become winners, i.e., their aggregate payment is always less than competitive payments. Moreover, comparison with standard market equilibrium highlights that markets are better off without such policies. Finally, numerical studies highlight the impact of heterogeneity and load size on market equilibrium.
@article{bcym2023tempr,
abstract = {The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market---e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets---is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads to undesirable price manipulation. To mitigate this, some Inde- pendent System Operators (ISOs) proposed system-level market power mitigation (MPM) policies in addition to existing local policies. These policies aim to substitute noncompetitive bids with a default bid based on estimated generator costs. However, these policies may lead to unintended consequences when implemented without accounting for the conflicting interest of participants. In this paper, we model the competition between generators (bidding supply functions) and loads (bidding quantity) in a two-stage market with a stage-wise MPM policy. An equilibrium analysis shows that a real-time MPM policy leads to equilibrium loss, meaning no stable market outcome (Nash equilibrium) exists. A day-ahead MPM policy, besides, leads to a Stackelberg-Nash game with loads acting as leaders and generators as followers. In this setting, loads become winners, i.e., their aggregate payment is always less than competitive payments. Moreover, comparison with standard market equilibrium highlights that markets are better off without such policies. Finally, numerical studies highlight the impact of heterogeneity and load size on market equilibrium.},
author = {Bansal, Rajni Kant and Chen, Yue and You, Pengcheng and Mallada, Enrique},
doi = {10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318149},
grants = {CAREER-1752362, CPS-2136324, EPICS-2330450},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation},
month = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {512-522},
record = {published, online Sep 2023, revised July 2023, under revision May 2023, submitted Jan 2023},
title = {Market Power Mitigation in Two-stage Electricity Market with Supply Function and Quantity Bidding},
url = {https://mallada.ece.jhu.edu/pubs/2023-TEMPR-BCYM.pdf},
volume = {1},
year = {2023}
}