Jesse and Aurik received Honorable Mention

Jesse Rines and Aurik Sarker, co-authors of the paper [1], received an honorable mention of the The Muly Family Undergraduate Research Award. Congrats!

[1] [doi] C. Avraam, J. Rines, A. Sarker, F. Paganini, and E. Mallada, “Voltage Collapse Stabilization in Star DC Networks,” in American Control Conference, 2019, pp. 1957-1964.
[Bibtex] [Abstract] [Download PDF]
Voltage collapse is a type of blackout-inducing dynamic instability that occurs when the power demand exceeds the maximum power that can be transferred through the network. The traditional (preventive) approach to avoid voltage collapse is based on ensuring that the network never reaches its maximum capacity. However, such an approach leads to inefficiencies as it prevents operators to fully utilize the network resources and does not account for unprescribed events. To overcome this limitation, this paper seeks to initiate the study of voltage collapse stabilization. More precisely, for a DC network, we formulate the problem of voltage stability as a dynamic problem where each load seeks to achieve a constant power consumption by updating its conductance as the voltage changes. We show that such a system can be interpreted as a dynamic game, where each player (load) seeks to myopically maximize their utility, and where every stable power flow solution amounts to a Local Nash Equilibrium. Using this framework, we show that voltage collapse is equivalent to the non-existence of a Local Nash Equilibrium in the game and, as a result, it is caused by the lack of cooperation between loads. Finally, we propose a Voltage Collapse Stabilizer (VCS) controller that uses (flexible) loads that are willing to cooperate and provides a fair allocation of the curtailed demand. Our solution stabilizes voltage collapse even in the presence of non-cooperative loads. Numerical simulations validate several features of our controllers.
@inproceedings{arspm2019acc,
  abstract = {Voltage collapse is a type of blackout-inducing dynamic instability that occurs when the power demand exceeds the maximum power that can be transferred through the network. The traditional (preventive) approach to avoid voltage collapse is based on ensuring that the network never reaches its maximum capacity. However, such an approach leads to inefficiencies as it prevents operators to fully utilize the network resources and does not account for unprescribed events. To overcome this limitation, this paper seeks to initiate the study of voltage collapse stabilization.

More precisely, for a DC network, we formulate the problem of voltage stability as a dynamic problem where each load seeks to achieve a constant power consumption by updating its conductance as the voltage changes. We show that such a system can be interpreted as a dynamic game, where each player (load) seeks to myopically maximize their utility, and where every stable power flow solution amounts to a Local Nash Equilibrium.

Using this framework, we show that voltage collapse is equivalent to the non-existence of a Local Nash Equilibrium in the game and, as a result, it is caused by the lack of cooperation
between loads. Finally, we propose a Voltage Collapse Stabilizer (VCS) controller that uses (flexible) loads that are willing to cooperate and provides a fair allocation of the curtailed demand. Our solution stabilizes voltage collapse even in the presence of non-cooperative loads. Numerical simulations validate several features of our controllers.},
  author = {Avraam, C. and Rines, J. and Sarker, A. and Paganini, F. and Mallada, E.},
  booktitle = {American Control Conference},
  doi = {10.23919/ACC.2019.8814708},
  grants = {CAREER-1752362,EPCN-1711188,ENERGISE-DE-EE0008006,ARO-W911NF-17-1-0092,EPCN-1711188,CPS-1544771},
  keywords = {Power Networks},
  month = {06},
  pages = {1957-1964},
  pubstate = {presented, submitted Sep. 2018},
  title = {Voltage Collapse Stabilization in Star DC Networks},
  url = {https://mallada.ece.jhu.edu/pubs/2019-ACC-ARSPM.pdf},
  year = {2019}
}