

Interconnection Compliance in High-IBR Grids

Robust + Decentralized Stability Analysis

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Interconnection Compliance in High-IBR Grids

- Recap: What We Know About IBR-Induced SSOs
- Compliance Challenges in Preventing SSOs
- Understanding SSOs: What We Know
- Impedance-Based Stability Analysis and Challenges
- New Methodology: Robust and Decentralized Stability Analysis
- Robustness vs Efficiency Trade-offs



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Recap: Sub Synchronous Oscillations

- **When do SSOs occur?**
 - **Series-compensated corridors** (SSCI)
 - **Weak grids** (low SCR, high impedance)
 - Clusters of **IBRs in remote areas**
 - After contingencies/topology changes (radialization)
 - During commissioning or controller retuning
- **What do SSOs depend on?**
 - **Network state:** impedance, SCR, topology, compensation level
 - **Control configuration:** PLL dynamics, outer/plant controllers, GFL vs GFM
 - **Operating point:** power flow direction, voltage setpoints, dispatch



Compliance Challenges in Preventing SSOs

- **Proprietary vendor models:** limited transparency in control details
 - What level of model detail should be mandatory for interconnection studies?
 - Can we certify “black-box” models without exposing sensitive IP?
- **Model fidelity:** dynamic scans sensitive to injection size, operating point, and sequence type
 - Should scans be standardized (e.g., fixed injection magnitudes, sequences)?
 - How do we account for nonlinearities and operating-point dependence in compliance tests?
- **Heterogeneity:** each IBR model/implementation behaves differently
 - Need for compliance requirements that’s technology-agnostic.
 - Should there be a universal format for reporting impedance/admittance?
- **Limited standardization:** SCR screening common, but no universal SSO margin tests
 - Should interconnection rules require explicit SSO stability margins (like they do for SCR)? How to define SSO stability margin?!
 - How do we define “pass/fail” for impedance-based stability checks?
- **Trade-off:** conservative criteria risk blocking projects; permissive criteria risk instability
 - Should compliance include operational flexibility (adaptive tuning) rather than fixed thresholds only?
 - How do we set stability margins without making interconnection overly restrictive?



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



*“Without a **clear methodology** to assess and prevent SSOs, these questions will remain unanswered — or worse, misanswered.”*

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

Understanding SSOs: What we know

- **Hopf bifurcation** as the onset mechanism
 - SSOs emerge through Hopf bifurcations.
 - This means **linearized small-signal models are sufficient** to capture the transition to instability.



Understanding SSOs: What we know and can do

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 - At the Point of Interconnection, stability can be analyzed by comparing inverter and grid impedances.




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Understanding SSOs: What we know and can do


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- At the Point of Interconnection, stability can be analyzed by comparing inverter and grid impedances.
- **Nyquist loop-gain criterion** $L(s) = \frac{Z_{grid}(s)}{Z_{IBR}(s)}$ explains why weak grids (high Z_{grid}) are more prone to instability.




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Challenges of Impedance Stability Analysis

- Z_{IBR}^i depends on:
 - Vendor Technology
 - Setpoints (P_i, Q_i)
- Z_{grid}^i depends on:
 - Location where it is measured
 - Network Topology
 - Power Flows (P_{net}, Q_{net})
 - Other connected devices



$$Z_{grid}^i(s) \neq Z_{grid}^j(s)$$




Robust, Decentralized Small-Signal Analysis

- **Goal:** Develop small-signal stability analysis methods that account for IBR's impedance variations & network operating conditions.

- **Key properties:**

- Requires individual tests on Z_{IBR}^i
- Handles variation of Z_{IBR}^i
- Characterizes valid grid operating conditions (P_{net}, Q_{net})
- Trade-off conservativeness between operating conditions and IBR dynamic constraints




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
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
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
Trade-off: Robustness vs Efficiency

- **Analysis unveils a fundamental trade-off:** expanding the dispatch region demands stricter limits on inverter frequency-domain behavior.

Stable Operating Points




Stable IBR Region



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
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


Stable IBR Region



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What We Know — and What's Still Open

✓ What's Known

- **Linear small-signal models are sufficient**
 - SSOs emerge via Hopf bifurcations → linearized models around operating points capture instability onset.
- **Accuracy over dynamic frequencies is sufficient**
 - Models only need to capture inverter behavior around sub-synchronous frequency ranges of interest.
- **Impedance-based margins are valid and certifiable**
 - Frequency-domain criteria define meaningful stability margins and can be applied using **black-box models**, preserving vendor IP.

? Many Questions Remain Open

- **Generalizing analysis for more realistic models**
 - Current analysis introduces simplifying assumptions that need to be removed.
- **How should dynamic testing be standardized?**
 - What scan conditions (frequency range, injection size, operating points) should be required?
- **How do we account for dispatch and operating point variability?**
 - Do we need impedance envelopes? Adaptive margins? Parametric certificates?
- **Should compliance be static or operationally adaptive?**
 - Should dispatch constraints or tuning flexibility be part of certification?
- **How do we balance robustness and flexibility?**
 - What is the minimal stability margin that still allows meaningful operational freedom?

